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Posts tagged ‘Africa’

Calls for new national think tanks in Africa: one or many?

Calls for new think tanks in Africa are getting more common. But while some see an opportunity for supporting the formation of several think tanks others favour large national Brookings-style centres. One big one or a few small ones?

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Economic downturn affects think tank funding

Foreign funding for think tanks seems to be decreasing, affecting institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world. Dependence on foreign funding and few domestic sources paint a worrying picture for their future. But is it the same for all?

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African Development Bank wants partnerships with leading think tanks; but is this the best way to support them?

"Partnering with think tanks needs to be part and parcel of the Bank's effort to become a strong knowledge broker" has said Hau Sing Tse, Executive Director of the African Development Bank for Canada, China, South Korea and Kuwait. But is this easier said than done?

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Foreign policy think tanks in developing countries

During the last couple of months we have been compiling a list of think tanks dedicated to foreign policy in developing nations. The idea behind this project was to get a better sense of the kind of topics that command the attention of researchers and policy makers when it comes to these nations’ relations to other countries and their interests in the international political arena. We were interested in this type of think tank in particular because, unlike their peers in the social and economic policy fields, domestic, rather than international, funders commonly fund these. And the search for sustainable and domestic sources of funding for think tanks in developing countries is a key concern for onthinktanks.org. The information that we have gathered from this first attempt at an annotated list of foreign policy think tanks has proven to be quite interesting, not only because of what we have found regarding the kind of topics they dedicate themselves to, but also because it brings up issues we have touched upon in the past, such as the use of social media and the nature of their funding. This post provides an analysis of the former.

One of the findings of the exercise is that foreign policy think tanks in developing nations are mostly focused on regional affairs. They care foremost about what is going on in their backyards, and so the topics they choose to research have to do with regional politics. For example, South Asian think tanks have much to do with security studies, be it traditional security or human security. Pakistani and Indian think tanks in particular deal with these issues, and are also interested in ethnic conflict, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation. This is to be expected, as these are also the main concerns of the region. Most Middle Eastern think tanks deal with the Arab–Israeli conflict, particularly those that are of countries directly involved in it. Curiously, they do not seem to focus as much on security studies, when common sense would believe it would be a main point of interest, regarding the volatility of the region.

Latin American foreign policy think tanks dedicate their efforts towards regional cooperation, economic integration, democracy studies, and defense. This is probably the case because there is a current regional integration process going on, UNASUR, and because this region has always been concerned with inserting itself into the international economic system, as well as with democratic stability. Also interesting is that most Latin American think tanks are hosted by universities, which is a good indication that foreign policy is still more of an academic pursuit and that there is, generally, little room for (or interest in) influencing public policy.

We found very few foreign policy think tanks in Africa: our list only includes South Africa. The two think tanks included work on issues such as peacekeeping and conflict management, arms control and disarmament, refugees and internally displaced persons, and economic integration: all relevant topics to African politics today.

Southeast Asian institutions are also mainly interested in national defense, ASEAN membership and impact, and Asia Pacific security. Why so much focus on these issues? There has currently been a significant arms race going on in this part of the world, as the Council on Foreign Relations’ blog Asia Unbound pointed out in 2010:

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the amount spent on weapons purchases in Southeast Asia nearly doubled between 2005 and 2009 alone, with Vietnam recently paying $2.4 billion for Russian submarines and jetfighters designed for attacking ships. Other recent buyers have included Malaysia, which recently spent nearly $1 billion on new submarines of its own, and Thailand, which has drawn up its own shopping list of submarines and more advanced jet fighters, while Indonesia and Singapore also have announced recent sizable arms purchases.

Countries like Vietnam and Malaysia are arming up to send a signal to a rising China that they will continue to protect their strategic interests and their claims to energy resources in areas like the South China Sea, the Mekong basin, and other regions. And though China has not deviated from its increasingly aggressive approach to Southeast Asia, these arms figures should give it pause.

Another explanation for why there seem to be so many foreign policy and security focused think tanks in this region is these countries’ developmental state and the regional dynamics that emerged between them. Their developmental status and proximity to each other has caused them to be in constant competition and so their relations with each other, as well as their security, are a main point of concern.

Another fact that called our attention was the high number of foreign policy think tanks in China. These, of course, are all either totally government-funded or have some link to the state. As mentioned in a previous post, Chinese think tanks are expected to conduct research and policy analysis on domestic, regional and global issues, assisting the government in policy formulation. This investment clearly signals that China is looking for a position of leadership in the future and explains the wide variety of topics that its think tanks focus on: new trends in international trade, security, Sino-American relations, regional cooperation, and most telling of all, regional studies. All of the think tanks included in the list had significant departments on most of the regions of the world, which suggests that the Chinese government wants to be well informed far beyond its backyard.

Finally, it appears that foreign policy think tanks go beyond regional interests when their own nations have broader aspirations. The Chinese case is clear, but this can also be said for South Africa, Brazil and Mexico. Mexico´s close ties to the United States may explain academic interest in foreign policy affairs; as for Brazil, it is known that it looks to lead Latin America, particularly through UNASUR. Also, it is safe to say that South Africa is one of the most developed countries of Africa, and so researchers can branch out and dedicate themselves to topics that for the most part dominate African think tanks, like economic development.

In future posts we will explore other aspects of this community of think tanks. If you would like to contribute to the list please get in contact with a.moncada56@gmail.com / @Andriu56, comment this blog, or simply update the list directly on Wikipedia (and in the meantime help make knowledge public).

A new political economy of research uptake in Africa: overview

RAPID and Mwananchi have published a series of studies by Emma Broadbent on the political economy of research uptake in Africa.

A bit of background: The Evidence-based Policy in Development Network (ebpdn) was set up to promote our understanding of the role that evidence plays in policy-making in developing countries and in international development policy. Several studies and events have helped to shed light on the factors that explain the uptake of evidence; factors that the Research and Policy in Development Programme synthesised, in 2003: the political context, the nature and presentation of the evidence, links or networks, and the external environment.

However, the ebpdn’s attention shifted in the late 2000s from an effort to understand the complex linkages that exist between research and policy communities to one focused on recording good influencing practices or demonstrating the impact that particular pieces of research had on policy. Research project driven case studies became the rule. This shift, in the view of some, limited the opportunities for learning that RAPID’s original work had offered.

Partly in response to this development, while I was Head of the RAPID programme, we, in partnership with the ebpdn’s Africa network, launched a series of studies that sought to turn this trend around and pay greater attention to the nuances of the relationship between research and policy.

In 2009 a group of Latin American researchers worked on a book published by ODI and International IDEA on the relationships between think tanks and political parties. The studies recognised that it was not possible to study policy research institutes, or think tanks, without understanding their political contexts. The case studies from Colombia (Partidos políticos y think tanks en Colombia), Ecuador (Partidos políticos y think tanks en el Ecuador), Peru (Think tanks y partidos políticos en el Perú: precariedad institucional y redes informales), Bolivia (Partidos políticos y think tanks en Bolivia), and Chile (Los think tanks y su rol en la arena política chilena) illustrated the complexity of the relationship between research and policy, as well as between researchers and policymakers. The idea of two separate research and policy communities was discarded, and the importance of their historical co-evolution highlighted.

A series of background studies for Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and East and Southeast Asia followed the Latin American studies; and these were followed by a more recent volume of studies that pays particular attention to the relationship between media and research centres in Latin America, promoted by ebpdn members in the region.

Inspired by this, Emma Broadbent took on the challenge to describe the relationship between think tanks and their environment in Sub-Sarahan Africa. Instead of focusing on an organisation or a piece of research, she took the policy debate as the unit of analysis.

Here, a policy debate is understood as a contested policy issue involving any number of actors who contribute to the debate by offering an argument relating to any aspect of the policy, for instance the policy problem, policy options, means of implementation and monitoring and evaluation. A policy debate can take place in a single space as a one-off event (in which case the number of participants is limited), or can occupy a limitless participatory space over a period of time. This paper is concerned with the latter.

Policy debates are often conducted with reference to political interests and faulty evidence, with each participant in a debate coming to the table with a particular ‘ask’ and understanding of the policy problem. Debates are thus unequal playing fields: they are made up of participants who possess varying objectives, expectations, capacities, understandings, motivations and commitment. Importantly, only some of these may be made explicit, given the potential for some actors not to think and act in a unified manner. For instance, actions may not reflect stated values, or stated intent may not accurately reflect actual intent.

Using research-based evidence as a starting point for a case study also hides the unavoidable fact that evidence does not mean the same to everyone. The label is often attached to a great deal of things: facts, opinions, arguments, and observations. Little is said about the perception that different policy players have of these different types of evidence or their source; even if, as we know and as Emma Broadbent’s studies show, this perception plays a significant role in explaining why certain ideas are more rapidly accepted than others.

Most importantly, the focus on research-into-policy case studies assumes that what matters in policy decisions are the facts and findings emerging from studies rather than the arguments that, by their nature, must draw from a range of sources of knowledge and power: values, tradition, legislation, fears, imaging, etc. Arguments and big ideas are what change the world. Facts and findings simply provide them with ammunition.

The studies discussed here focus on policy debates in four of the countries in which the Mwananchi programme, which provided support for the study, operates:

They offer an opportunity to address concerns about how evidence is used in policy-making. With the debates as a starting point, Broadbent tracked back the origin of the different arguments used by the various parties involved. She considered the different interpretations and sources of the evidence presented and employed by different actors; the roles that local and international policy actors play; and the specific and relative role played by research centres, researchers, and research-based evidence.

As a consequence, the case studies offer us a much richer description of the context, as well as ample opportunities to investigate further the complex relationship between research and policy.

It is worth reviewing the synthesis paper:  Politics of research-based evidence in African policy debates. Its main findings, conclusions and implications include:

  • Surprisingly (?), given the attention to make policy more evidence based, all four cases, specially in the Zambian one, the role of research based evidence in the policy debates was relatively high.
  • However, we should not overestimate the role of research based evidence:

Even when it is used, research is often poorly referenced and seemingly selective; the full implications of research findings are poorly understood; and the logical leap required to move from research cited in relation to a specific policy problem (e.g. HIV/AIDS transmission trends in Uganda) to the policy prescription or solution proposed (e.g. the criminalisation of HIV/AIDS transmission) is often vast. Sometimes, research-based evidence plays almost no role, and arguments on one or more sides of the debate are driven by personal prediction, assumption, reflection on past precedent and commitment to the idea of progress. The case studies each emphasise the role of different types of evidence, particularly that arising from citizens, or the grassroots.

  •  To assess it we should consider three types of factors that explain the role research based evidence plays:

Debate-specific factors, relating to the locus of a debate and the perceived existence of a policy debate;
Discursive and cognitive factors, relating to how policy debates are framed, how research and evidence are understood and research capacity at institutional level; and

Proximate, agency-oriented factors, relating to the political, tactical and strategic factors that intersect with the nature of the debate and the discursive and cognitive aspects of policy debates identified.

  • A key finding of the studies is that greater efforts need to be made to unpack what we understand by ‘evidence’ and recognise that we may not all be talking about the same thing. It may very well be that evidence is readily available but that, in fact, what is lacking is the capacity and incentives to use it. Not using certain evidence can be, in fact, a strategy -entirely logical if one recognises that policy processes are necessarily political:

However, when considering why the role of research-based evidence is smaller, this paper argues that this cannot be explained in terms of a ‘lack’ (of capacity, of research, of funding, of space for dialogue, of ownership) which can be filled (more capacity, more funding, more dialogue, better access to research); rather, it is not being used because there are significant incentives not to use it. Instrumentalisation of lack of capacity—which makes itself known in areas other than research–policy in Africa—thus describes a situation where there are significant advantages to a lack of capacity (assessed – in admittedly ill-defined – terms of the capacity to undertake, understand, and use research-based evidence), and/or significant disadvantages to improving this capacity (again, in this case, measured in terms of research-based evidence). The situation is thus sustained and in fact instrumentalised in order to fulfil a number of varied and interrelated objectives, including resistance to reform, the defence of national identity and autonomy and avoidance of scrutiny.

  •  Finally, the implications and recommendations of the research are relevant for think tanks and their funders (edited quotes):
    • Researchers are supported to promote ‘my’ research, with little acknowledgement of the inevitable political interests, constraints, pressures and incentives research is a product of, nor of its discursive context
    • Indeed, a more fruitful—and significantly more considerable—undertaking would be to turn our attention to improving the quality of policy debates to enhance the ability of people to discuss policy using critical thought.
    • A central part of any effort needs to address levels of understanding relating to research methodologies and the philosophy of science, in order to help users of evidence understand and appreciate the limitations of particular evidence and locate an approach to gathering evidence among wider discussions about what constitutes valid evidence and rigorous research.
    • Approaches to supporting ‘better’ policy debate would also include supporting the role of ‘mediators’ to analyse debates, thereby creating something of linearity in a debate in which evidence gaps can be identified and public demands for research-based evidence made and filled.
    • In some cases, what appears to be a lack of capacity to undertake, use and understand research-based evidence cannot be addressed purely through ‘more’: ‘more’ capacity, ‘more’ research and ‘more’ links between researchers and policymakers.

Call for proposals for peer assistance for African and Asian think tanks

CIPPEC and GDNet have launched a call for peer assistance between African and Asian think tanks and their peers in Latin America. Its general objective is to help strengthen African and Asian centres by sharing knowledge and experience from Latin America.

The centres in Africa and Asia can apply to visit a centre in Latin America for 1 week to learn about strategic planning, strategic communications, fundraising and programme management, policy influence action planning, networking, and monitoring and evaluation of policy influence actions.

You can download the terms of reference here.

Is religion a ‘no no’ for think tanks?

The Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR) is a very interesting think tank. It does not just talk about evidence but also about faith. Its mission statement is:

To foster from a faith-inspired perspective a critical understanding of current issues. Guided by the Church’s Social Teaching that emphasises dignity in community, our mission is to generate activities for the promotion of the fullness of human life through research, education, advocacy and consultation. Cooperating widely with other groups, our Jesuit sponsorship directs us to a special concern for the poor and assures an international linkage to our efforts. We aim to promote an inculturated (sic) faith, gender equality and empowerment of local communities in the work of justice and peace and the integrity of creation.

Maybe they have a point. Research from North America shows that atheists are distrusted as much as rapists:

The study, conducted among 350 Americans adults and 420 Canadian college students, asked participants to decide if a fictional driver damaged a parked car and left the scene, then found a wallet and took the money, was the driver more likely to be a teacher, an atheist teacher, or a rapist teacher?

The participants, who were from religious and nonreligious backgrounds, most often chose the atheist teacher.

This moral distrust of non-believers is relevant in very religious societies -and much of the developing world qualifies as such. By combining religion (with explicit references to values) organisations like JCTR are able to award a certain degree of credibility to the, less face it, sometimes God-less work of the researcher -who will not believe it until it can be measured.

Think Tanks: At Work – 2010-2011 Think Tank Initiative Annual Report

Yesterday I mentioned the latest TTI annual report on a post that put forward some ideas to be considered, hopefully, by the TTI.

The report has now been published on line, including a version in Spanish.

I had a chance to read it and have to say that it get very close to being a report about think tanks as much as a report about the initiative itself. It offers accounts from various think tanks, a review of the areas of work and focus of the grantees (it would be great to play a bit with that data -for instance, science and technology is largely absent; with some exceptions), and some interesting information about assumptions underpinning the initiative.

There are also some very specific examples of how the think tanks in the initiative have used the core funds they have received:

The Ugandan Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC) and the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) in Kenya have purchased costly statistical and modelling software. The simple ability to afford the appropriate tools has led to the production of more robust research.

The Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF), in Tanzania, reduced its share of commissioned work and is now focusing on a number of strategic projects. What used to stand alone as a commissioned research unit has now been reintegrated into the unit responsible for research and publications.

The Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER), in Ghana, has built new relationships with public and private media to better communicate its research results to the policy community, civil society organizations, and the private sector.

The African Institute for Applied Economics (AIAE), in Nigeria, has improved its governance systems and better communicates with and reports to its Board of Directors, which has resulted in increasing support from its governing bodies.

Fundación ARU in Bolivia, one of the program’s younger institutions, has begun setting up the organizational structure that will sustain its policy research activities: it has defined its long-term research agenda, increased its pool of researchers, and designed a new governance structure that separates the strategic and executive functions.

Another Bolivian institution, the Instituto de Estudios Avanzados en Desarrollo (INESAD), has seen its visibility increase through being associated with the Think Tank Initiative. New donors have approached the institution for the first time to explore partnerships.

Grupo FARO, in Ecuador, has created a new Research Director position, which in turn has supported the implementation of formal systems of research quality control and support for researchers, resulting in improved research products and dissemination.

The Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka (IPS) has adapted the Initiative’s monitoring and evaluation tools to improve its own internal organizational performance monitoring system. The discussion and planning that went into the development of this monitoring and evaluation system has created awareness of organizational strengths and weaknesses among the staff, which has also increased motivation and pride.

The Public Affairs Centre (PAC), in India, has organized exchange platforms where staff from like-minded organizations based in other countries, and even other regions, visit the institution for mutual capacity building.

These are interesting ‘findings’. It shows the different types of priorities that think tanks have: improving their research capacity, their organisational structure and governance, their communications and engagement, and defining a strategic direction. There are other examples not mentioned in the report: FUSADES and KIPPRA have organised study tours to visit organisations in other countries. GRADE is working on its research agenda. IEP is working on its communications and M&E strategy. Et cetera.

Read the full report in English and Spanish.

A new think tank model: a focus on productive sectors

A few posts ago I wrote about the idea of setting up think tanks around natural resources (although the idea is perfectly valid for any productive sector).

[Sector] Think tanks can be a great engine of change. They can take on the interests of the industry and the wider public and pursue policy options that governments are sometimes unable to contemplate until they are sure things. Think tanks can help to establish alliances with peer organisations in other countries without the bureaucratic difficulties that the public sector has or the concerns for competition that are common in the private sector. Unlike lobbies or interest groups they can remain neutral or at least ensure that different options are considered and discussed publicly. Their interests, if well-funded and managed, can the long-term interests of their sectors and countries.

I even suggested a few candidates for think tanks in many developing countries looking at Tourism, mining, tobacco, oil and gas, financial services, et cetera. And I think I will add tourism for my plans for Peru.

I also provided some ideas of what the model could look like:

The initial investments need not be terribly large. These think tanks could start quite modestly by providing a medium to channel knowledge and expertise from around the world into the national and local policy debate. A few good analysts and a competent policy communicator would probably do for the first year. An alliance with a university could create opportunities for original research being produced in-country and to channel new knowledge into the education system through undergraduate and postgraduate courses. Partnerships with the private sector would be essential to ensure that their work is relevant to the sector.

These think tanks could focus their attention at three levels:

  1. The policy environment: research and analysis to develop recommendations directed at improving the policy environment that affects the sector
  2. The business environment: research, analysis and direct support aimed at strengthening the capacity of existing and future businesses to further develop the industry –sustainably, responsibly, etc.
  3. The art and science of the sector: (maybe in the long-term) aimed at improving the evidence base of the sector –for example, research into new varieties of timber, into new ways of treating mineral waste, into the commercialisation of new agricultural products, the use of new seeds, etc.

I have now given this a bit more thought and I think there is much more to this than I first considered.

Policy coherence

Governments often struggle to get their many ministries and public institutions to work together. Government sectors are usually matched by think tanks and consultancies that arrange their businesses along the same lines: health, education, transport, natural resources, taxing, etc. If there is a ministry then it is likely that there will be a think tank programme to match it (or at least an NGO to campaign about something). In an attempt to address this compartmentalisation of policy, a number of ‘cross-cutting’ issues have been promoted by donors, governments, NGOs and think tanks alike: gender, governance, human rights, etc.. But these have done little to bring coherence to public policy. In general, these specialisations only help to segment the market even further and create silos promoted by new ‘experts’.

Productive sector think tanks could be the solution. To strengthen the tourism industry, for instance, policy recommendations would have to involve not just the Ministry of Tourism, but also transport (we need roads, airports, airline routes, etc.), education (we need hospitality graduates), health and sanitation (we need to make sure tourists do not catch some strange disease), environment (we need to preserve the environment to attract more tourists and ensure that tourism does not affect it), culture, trade, taxation, labour, etc.

Unlike the usual approach of trying to get them all to coordinate at a fairly abstract level (‘develop the country’, ‘reduce poverty’, ‘meet the MDGs’, etc.) in this case they would be working together to achieve much more tangible objectives: to make the industry competitive, to increase the number of tourists, to develop new tourism attractions, etc. It would then be much easier for think tanks to make very clear and costed recommendations -clear and tangible enough for policymakers to get on with them and know exactly how they are contributing towards the stated objectives.

Developing an expert cadre

Sector think tanks could serve another important function: to develop new generations of experts. With a focus on the sector, your economists, engineers, lawyers, medical doctors, agronomists, etc. could quickly develop their analytical skills, learn about good practices and lessons from around the world, establish and strengthen links and networks with more experienced national, regional and international experts, and become experts in their own right.

Both the public and the private sectors would benefit from this: the public sector would have a pick of competent analysts and policymakers, while the private sector may find in these new experts excellent strategists and consultants.

If these career paths are properly developed then young graduates would naturally covet these positions and the think tanks would find it increasingly easier to find the right staff for their purposes.

Is this just another way of funding lobbies?

No. First of all, I am not suggesting that these think tanks should be supported by Aid (they could be given some seed funding but in the end their main funders should be the industry and the government through no-strings-attached arrangements).

Secondly, the point of setting up a think tank is to make it independent of the individual and private interests of the sector and its corporate members. A think tank, a not-for -profit, is governed by different rules than those governing lobbies or corporations, and can be expected to be public in its dealings. Whereas private companies tend to hide their influencing practices, what the think tank does, how it pays for it, its research base, its links, etc. can be known to all.

Finally, setting up and funding a sector think tank can also help the industry itself by promoting better business practices (better wages, environmentally friendly practices, etc.). In this sense it would be in fact advocating in favour of the public rather than the industry.

 

What do you think? Is there any more to this? Is it worth pursuing further? I would really like to know what you think.

The Standard: Africa home to only 2.3 per cent world’s researchers

A recent discussion on the EBPDN Africa on-line community prompted a debate on the capacity of researchers in Africa. Awuor Ponge from IPAR forwarded this article from The Standard: Africa home to only 2.3 per cent world’s researchers.

Excluding South Africa, intensity in research and development in Sub-Saharan Africa is merely 0.3 per cent. Unfortunately, whereas the percentage of Gross Domestic Product devoted to research and development has significantly increased in other regions, it has dropped or stagnated in almost all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa besides South Africa.

The article reports on a lecture by Prof Mahmood Mamdani, Director of Makerere University’s Institute of Social Research, who made very important points.

On financial aid:

Mamdani told his audience collaboration has been reduced to assistance, and now there is an emerging theory that African academics cannot do research without outside financial aid. He said consultancy culture is being institutionalised in African universities through basic courses in research methodology, courses that teach students a set of tools to gather and process quantitative information from which to cull answers.

“Proliferation of short courses on methodology that aim to teach students and academic staff quantitative methods necessary to gathering and processing empirical data are ushering a new generation of native informers,” said Mamdani.

On the prevailing business model:

The culture of consultancy has radically changed postgraduate education and research  as consultants presume that research is all about finding answers to problems defined by a client. Mamdani says consultancy driven postgraduate education requires immediate answers to research problems. “It has almost become a matter of policy in most African universities for PhD students to provide a set of recommendations from their thesis for use by the funding external non-governmental organisations,” says Mamdani.

The emerging scenario is that funding scarcities in African universities have led scholars to market driven research where quality control is almost absent. “Moonlighting for donor agencies has endangered the quality of teaching and research in Kenya’s universities,” says the current Unesco World Social Science Report.

This has obvious implications for think tanks. If Universities are not producing sufficient researchers then where are the funds for research that many ‘think tanks’ receive going to? Is this why salaries are often higher in some African countries than they are in developed economies like the UK or the US?

How many think tanks and research centres are being really independent? How many are developing research programmes and projects without the interference of donors?

This, of course, is not only relevant for Africa.

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