I didn’t know much about the Istanbul Policy Center until a recent call with its director, Senem Aydın Düzgit. That, in itself, says something about the way the Turkish think tank landscape often appears from the outside: fragmented, politically charged, and, at least in terms of visible, independent policy research organisations, surprisingly thin, given the country’s economic and political weight.
Senem put it plainly: Turkey does have organisations that call themselves think tanks, but many operate close to government or party structures, which makes genuinely independent, non-partisan analysis harder to sustain, and sometimes harder to even recognise as such. In that context, she argued that IPC’s significance is less about being “one more think tank” and more about what it represents: a long-running, institutionally anchored, internationally connected policy centre that has learned to operate with independence in a tightening civic space.
This profile of the Istanbul Policy Center illustrates the reality of many think tanks across the world, which day in and day out work to deliver their missions while firmly walking a tightrope.
A university-based think tank
The Istanbul Policy Centre‘s first defining feature is its institutional home. It sits inside Sabanci University, a private foundation university, which gives IPC something invaluable in the Turkish context: room to manoeuvre. Senem described that this arrangement provides the basics that many independent think tanks struggle to secure year after year: premises, the legitimacy of an academic institution, and a small “core” of funded administrative capacity. As the director, she is also a professor at the university (a dual role that is built into the model), and the university covers a small support team and the physical infrastructure. This matters because it reduces the constant existential anxiety that comes from chasing after short-term project funds just to keep the lights on. It also gives IPC a kind of institutional shielding: not immunity, but a sturdier platform from which to publish, convene, and speak.
With this setup, many university-based think tanks opt for a quiet existence.
But IPC chooses not to.
With its own public agenda
Beyond the core team, IPC runs on externally funded programmes and partnerships delivered by a staff of around 30 people at any given time. One partnership stands out as a pillar: IPC’s long-standing collaboration with Stiftung Mercator, which has supported IPC for about a decade through fellowships and programme funding, and forms a major component of the centre’s portfolio. It has additional support from partners such as the European Climate Foundation and Bloomberg Philanthropies, among others.
This “hybrid” business model (university-backed core plus a large project portfolio) helps explain both IPC’s resilience and its ability to stay internationally connected even when domestic space tightens.
What does IPC do with that platform? Senem described a set of clusters that align with both Turkey’s policy challenges and international agendas. IPC is particularly strong in global affairs and international politics (her own area of expertise), and has a substantial footprint in energy transition and climate policy. In addition, IPC has built out work in areas that are increasingly hard to ignore anywhere: digital policy and broader sustainability questions. Looking at IPC’s own description of its research areas, this breadth is reflected in clusters spanning climate change, democratisation and institutional reform, energy transition (via SHURA Energy Transition Center), + urbanisation and local governance, and conflict resolution/mediation, among others.
Independence and engagement
The third defining feature is not a programme area at all: it is how IPC thinks about independence and influence. How to be influential when the policy space is closed and closing fast?
Senem was clear on an institutional red line: IPC does not take money from government or political parties. It tries to remain at arm’s length. And yet, IPC does not withdraw into purity. Instead, it navigates the complex reality of Turkish politics. Senem offered a practical example: Turkey will host a major COP meeting in 2026, and IPC has become something of a hub for COP-related activity domestically. In this particular policy space, the government needs expertise and credible convening, and IPC can engage without compromising its independence, precisely because it does not rely on government funding and can choose the terms of engagement.
That’s a nuanced posture: not “we never talk to the state,” but “we don’t sell our independence to the state.” This is a subtle but important difference.
This navigation logic also extends to IPC’s democracy-related work. Senem did not suggest they have abandoned a normative agenda; she argued the opposite: democracy remains part of their intellectual and organisational identity. But she was candid about the constraints: it has become harder to fund and to see direct pathways to application for projects on rule of law or democratisation in a system sliding toward deeper authoritarianism. So IPC adapts by keeping work analytical, comparative, and internationally framed where needed (for example, examining autocratisation through law not only in Turkey but also in other cases, such as Hungary), and by calibrating how and where findings are communicated. The point is not self-censorship as a strategy; it is survival with purpose.
If you step back, IPC becomes a useful case for a broader conversation we keep having in the think tank world: where is the line between principled distance and strategic engagement when the civic space is closing? Some organisations draw the line so closely that they refuse to engage with institutions that violate democratic norms; others argue that expertise can still improve policy outcomes for the public, even under illiberal governments, and that withdrawing cedes policy space to less credible actors. IPC seems to occupy a pragmatic middle ground: holding independence through funding discipline and institutional anchoring, while remaining open to influence in domains where expertise is valued, political temperature is lower, and engagement aligns with their agenda.
Usefulness in a rapidly shrinking civic space
For me, a takeaway is not that “Turkey is exceptional.” Senem repeatedly noted that national contexts vary; capacity, repression, and political risk vary across countries. But the pattern is widely recognisable: shrinking civic space, captured institutions, pressure on independent knowledge producers, and a funding landscape that often rewards short-term deliverables over long-term institutional resilience.
We have been documenting think tanks in these contexts for years. In that environment, IPC’s business model, university-backed core, diversified international funding, strong thematic clusters, and a carefully managed stance toward the state, offer a set of lessons worth paying attention to, well beyond Turkey.
If this were a short note to myself, it would end like this: IPC is not only interesting because of what it publishes; it’s interesting because of how it has made itself viable and how it continues to find routes to being useful in an increasingly unfriendly environment.