An interview with Dr Ibrahim M. Zikirullahi (Executive Director, Resource Centre for Human Rights and Civic Education – CHRICED), a think tank in Kano State, Nigeria.
Editor’s note: This interview has been lightly edited for clarity and flow, while keeping Dr Zikirullahi’s voice and meaning.
CHRICED is a Nigerian civil society organisation founded in 2006, with offices in Abuja and Kano. In this conversation, its Executive Director, Dr Ibrahim M. Zikirullahi, explains how a long campaign—combining evidence, citizen mobilisation, media, and legislative strategy—helped push forward a Free Maternal and Child Healthcare framework in Kano State. (CHRICED’s work on the bill and broader campaign has been widely reported, including the range of activities they used: research, baseline studies, town halls, media outreach, stakeholder consultations, and legislative retreats, with support from MISEREOR/KZE in Germany)
Enrique Mendizabal: You told me a story that captures what your organisation really does and why influence is never “just research”. Can you tell it again?
Dr Ibrahim M. Zikirullahi: Thank you. The story is about our work on maternal and child mortality in Kano State.
For the last 20 years, Nigeria has continued to remain at the top when it comes to maternal and child mortality. And within Nigeria, Kano State, because it is the largest state, with over 12 million people, carries a very significant share of that burden.
For us, it was an irony: a mother trying to bring forth another life loses her own life instead. So we decided we needed to do something.
We approached one of our partners in Germany, MISEREOR/KZE, and they graciously embraced the effort.
Enrique: Many people start with the Abuja Declaration—“15% for health”—and stop there. Where did you start?
Dr Zikirullahi: We did look at the Abuja Declaration; this idea that governments should target allocating at least 15% of annual budgets to improve the health sector.
So we started advocating. We pointed to the dilapidated infrastructure and all the gaps.
But as we sat down and looked closely at what was happening, we realised something important: it was not only about more money — it was also about how the money was being used.
Enrique: What did you find?
Dr Zikirullahi: In the process, we found that around 80–85% of the allocation was going to recurrent expenditure, the day-to-day costs, rather than investments that could actually change outcomes.
So we came to a conclusion: this is where the problem lies. It is about using the resources available, not just that there are none.
And from there, we moved strongly into social accountability.
Enrique: What did “social accountability” look like in practice?
Dr Zikirullahi: It meant mobilising citizens to demand the prudent use of resources already available.
We organised many interfaces, town hall meetings, where we brought elected and appointed public officials face-to-face with their constituents. Over time, it became something officials expected: they were always looking forward to the next event.
Gradually, there was a shift. The balance began to move: more going into capital projects, less swallowed by recurrent expenditure. For us that was a key sign: pressure and scrutiny were changing behaviour.
Enrique: At some point, you pivoted from budget pressure to the legal framework. Why?
Dr Zikirullahi: Because we asked: what are the gaps in the legal framework? And we found there were many.
Kano had earlier efforts—an approach that began in the early 2000s around free maternal and child health services. But we felt: if you are serious, there is no point in doing episodic reform.
Kano’s experience goes back to policies such as executive orders initiated around 2001, and we worried about how vulnerable reforms can be when they are not properly institutionalised.
So we argued: there is a need for a comprehensive review and a framework that can survive political cycles.
And yes, watching global politics also teaches you something: even places with strong institutions can face shocks. So why would we assume our own reforms will automatically endure?
Enrique: How did you engage the legislature, given how busy lawmakers are?
Dr Zikirullahi: Exactly, lawmakers are busy. We didn’t think it would work to only do quick advocacy calls or short media messages aimed at them.
So we planned something different: a multi-day legislative retreat completely outside Kano State where they would not be distracted.
We brought in scholars from academia, civil society practitioners, medical professionals, and the Nigerian Bar Association. It wasn’t one voice; it was a structured, credible set of perspectives.
Presentations were made, and then the bill was broken down by thematic areas. Members of the assembly were assigned to work with different groups, making it collaborative rather than confrontational.
At the end, when we discussed the challenges, the Speaker reassured us and asked members to take up the bill as a private member’s bill, sponsored by legislators.
Then he told us: what you should do now is win the public.
Enrique: And that’s where the media strategy became central?
Dr. Zikirullahi: Yes. We stepped it up.
We went to the traditional councils. We presented the issues. The buy-in was easier than many people think — because everyone knows the problem is real.
And then we ran radio programming for 52 weeks — live programmes in English, Pidgin, and local language — with call-ins.
We used a short time to introduce the topic, and then we opened the lines. People told stories — recent incidents, lived experience. It became a major issue, and importantly, a public issue — not just a “CSO issue”.
Women were particularly mobilised. You would see women talking to their husbands, and sometimes those husbands were themselves in the legislative house: “Have you listened to this programme? This is what they said today on the radio.”
That is how pressure becomes real.
Enrique: What changed—concretely?
Dr Zikirullahi: The legislature moved. The bill went through its readings and was passed.
From there, it advanced to becoming law, and now the next phase is implementation: to help design the implementation plan and to monitor and evaluate it.
One important point: this did not happen overnight. It was years — yes, there was research, but also network-building, convening, and continuous engagement.
And that is the lesson: influence is rarely a straight line.
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Enrique: If you had to sum up the “formula” behind this case of influence, what would you say it was?
Dr Zikirullahi: I would say:
- Start from the lived problem; not from a report.
- Use evidence to find the real blockage (sometimes it’s not “more money”; it’s how money is used).
- Mobilise citizens, especially those most affected.
- Create direct accountability spaces; officials facing constituents.
- Build a path to institutionalisation; because without law and implementation, progress can be reversed.
That is what we tried to do.