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This article was written as part of the publication of the 2024 On Think Tanks State of the Sector Report. Explore the report and resources here.
The 2024 State of the Sector report revealed that the majority (70%) of the 37 surveyed Think tanks in sub-Saharan Africa have voiced optimism about their ability to operate freely while over half (57%) are able to navigate the political divide successfully. Only 31% of the think tanks in Sub-Saharan Africa suggested that they would be impacted by the political situation in their countries in the next 12 months. This suggests a positive outlook on the political environment for think tanks in sub-Saharan Africa.
This finding coincides with previous years’ optimism among African think tanks. However, a closer look reveals a more complex reality. While this optimism might reflect genuine progress, it could also highlight the adaptive strategies think tanks have developed to avoid government scrutiny in the wake of declining democracy. This article unpacks these dynamics, examining how think tanks navigate politics in Africa and what this means for their work.
The Optimism of African Think Tanks
Majority of the sub-Saharan African think tanks surveyed reported that there exist favourable conditions that allow them to engage with diverse political actors (57%) and conduct research without significant restrictions (70%). This optimism could reflect a perception that the political space for evidence and policy influence is widening. Indeed, some think tanks, for example, ACEPA, through its Data for Accountability project, have managed to establish productive relationships with governments and political leaders, enhancing their ability to contribute to public policy debates across ideological lines.
This positive sentiment is counterintuitive when juxtaposed with current political trends. The think tanks surveyed in sub-Saharan Africa ranged from those found in Closed Autocracies (2), Electoral Autocracies (18), Electoral Democracies (17) to none in Liberal Democracies. According to the 2024 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) report, Africa’s democratic space has been shrinking over the past decade. While some countries, such as Ghana and Botswana, continue to show strong democratic tendencies, others have seen significant democratic backsliding. Across the continent, increasing constraints on civil liberties, freedom of expression, media independence, and political competition illustrate these trends. This democratic decline could suggest a challenging environment for truly independent think tanks, as governments may not welcome critical assessments that question their policies or highlight governance shortcomings.
In this context, the optimism of African think tanks might be both strategic and practical. By aligning their research with government priorities, think tanks can sustain their operations and avoid political repression, even in countries with diminishing democratic space. However, this may limit their ability to question state policies and undertake more critical research.
So why are think tanks in sub-Saharan Africa hopeful?
Aligning with government agendas: An unspoken strategy?
One possible reason is that think tanks in sub-Saharan Africa may be cautiously aligning their agendas with government priorities to avoid crackdowns. Indeed, the survey data revealed that 25% of the respondents’ think tanks in sub-Saharan Africa say the government drives the research and policy agenda more or primarily. African governments often view civil society organisations and think tanks as part of a broader social movement or civil society ecosystem, groups they associate with public accountability and political advocacy. However, think tanks often seek to avoid this perception, which can lead to a delicate balancing act: conducting research that aligns sufficiently with government priorities to avoid scrutiny while still maintaining a semblance of independence.
This alignment is not necessarily problematic, as it can enable think tanks to remain operational and potentially influence policy from within. It is also consistent with reports from the State of the Sector survey that think tanks in non-democratic regimes are just as able to inform policy as those in democratic regimes. However, it raises questions about the extent of their autonomy. If think tanks are compelled to shape their agendas around government interests, how independent are they in setting their research priorities? And, more crucially, how free are they to tackle politically sensitive issues, such as corruption, political accountability, and human rights?
Notably, the 2024 State of Sector report revealed that more than half (58%) of the surveyed think tanks in sub-Saharan Africa were affected by political polarisation, even though only less than half (34%) were affected by the political situation in their country in the past 12 months. In politically polarised environments, think tanks face unique pressures, and Africa is no exception. Polarisation can make it challenging for these organisations to maintain both their independence and their influence, especially when political actors increasingly use or dismiss evidence based on partisan needs.
This raises critical questions: Are think tanks aligning their agendas to avoid political backlash? And if so, how does this shape the kind of evidence they produce and use?
Building trust amidst political polarisation
Political polarisation erodes trust not only in institutions but also in the evidence they produce. In Africa, think tanks are often perceived as either government-aligned or as “foreign agents” of international interests. See for example the case of Kenya that investigated 16 civil society organisations for allegedly supporting the June 2024 anti-government protests. This lack of trust can hinder the impact of their work, especially in countries where democratic backsliding, as reported by V-Dem, creates a hostile environment for independent civil society.
It is no surprise then, that in polarised contexts, some sub-Sahara African think tanks may avoid tackling highly divisive or “thorny” issues, such as governance failures, political corruption, or the politics of evidence use. Addressing these thorny issues could lead to significant pushback, affecting funding or even the organisation’s legal status. Therefore, some think tanks sidestep these topics to maintain good standing with political actors, which has implications for their independence and their impact.
The optimism African think tanks express about their future might reflect more of a strategic adaptation to their polarised environments than an actual widening of democratic space. By aligning with government priorities, framing evidence in socially unifying ways, and engaging diverse coalitions, they have carved out a place in policy debates. However, the costs to their independence and the potential narrowing of their research agendas remain critical concerns.
African think tanks are increasingly resilient, but true independence in polarised environments remains a complex aspiration. As the V-Dem report on democratic backsliding suggests, the political space for think tanks and civil society in Africa may continue to shrink. Yet, through transparency, think tanks can continue to play an essential role in advancing evidence use, even when polarisation threatens to limit their freedom.
Despite these constraints, think tanks remain hopeful, possibly because they recognise the incremental gains they have achieved. In many cases, they have successfully embedded themselves within national policy processes and gained the trust of policymakers. This cooperation can sometimes lead to constructive dialogue and policy influence, even if it requires some compromise. Moreover, think tanks might view their adaptability as a strength, allowing them to continue their work even within constrained political environments.
The reality is that many think tanks must balance their research agendas with the political realities of their countries, leading to a possible compromise in their independence. For think tanks to remain truly influential, they will need to find ways to engage with governments constructively while preserving their ability to question and challenge policy where necessary.
In the end, the optimism of African think tanks is both a strength and a vulnerability. It allows them to adapt and survive, but it also raises crucial questions about the future of evidence-informed policymaking in polarised Africa. For think tanks, the challenge will be finding ways to retain their influence without compromising the depth, rigour, and independence that make their work meaningful.