Sustaining policy relevance under pressure: Institutional resilience among sub-Saharan African think tanks

Editor’s note: This is a short report, published as part of our partner insights on the State of the Sector 2026 report. It is a longer read than most blogs, and intended to be so. Please scroll to the end to read the full piece!

About this report

This is one of a series of local reports that accompany the global Think Tank State of the Sector Report 2026, produced by OTT. The global report provides an annual snapshot of the think tank sector worldwide. It draws on data from OTT’s State of the Sector 2026 survey.

This report has been produced by the African Center for Equitable Development (ACED), offering deeper insights into the sub-Saharan African context. ACED developed the report, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of OTT or its funders.

Authors

• Ariel Hardy HOUESSOU, Senior Specialist, Knowledge Translation, ACED
• Claudia TCHOBO, Executive Assistant, ACED
• Rodrigue Castro GBEDOMON, Research Director, ACED
• Fréjus S. THOTO, Executive Director, ACED.

1. Key messages

Policy relevance remains strong among the think tanks surveyed. Among the 50 sub-Saharan African organisations surveyed, 92% report contributing directly to a specific policy or public debate over the past year. Sixty-four per cent are satisfied or very satisfied with their influence on decision-makers. Respondents report contributions across health, economic governance, security and national development planning.

The current funding shock is exposing structural vulnerabilities that pre-date it. More than half of respondents (56%) rely predominantly or almost entirely on project-based funding. Funding cycles are short: 46% report typical contracts of one to two years and 32% of two to four years. None report contracts lasting more than four years. At the same time, 42% struggle to cover indirect costs, 24% have no financial reserves, and half expect an unfavourable funding environment over the next 12 months.

Policy needs matter, but funding availability strongly conditions what can be pursued. Government bodies and policymakers are the actors most often ranked first in shaping research and policy agendas. Yet 88% of respondents cite funding availability as shaping the national agenda, and 84% as shaping their own organisational agenda. The findings point less to simple donor control than to an interaction between policy demand, stakeholder expectations and available resources.

AI adoption is rapid, while institutional resilience remains a deeper challenge. Eighty-four per cent of respondents already use artificial intelligence. Use is concentrated in research (66%), communications (62%) and administration (52%), compared with 26% for fundraising. Yet fundraising is the most widely cited capacity need (84%), followed by innovation and adaptability, communications and strategic planning. Technological adaptation is advancing rapidly, but it does not remove the need for stronger institutional foundations.

2. Context and scope of the analysis

The 2026 State of the Sector survey provides a snapshot of how think tanks are navigating a changing operating environment. This report focuses on the 50 sub-Saharan African organisations that participated in the survey. It draws on both quantitative responses and respondents’ qualitative explanations.

The analysis is not statistically representative of the think tank sector across sub-Saharan Africa. The global survey covers 299 organisations, with sample sizes varying considerably by country and region. The findings should therefore be read as reflecting the experiences and perceptions of the organisations surveyed.

Open-text responses illuminate the quantitative findings and explain how organisations interpret changes in funding, operating conditions, and institutional priorities. These responses illustrate particular experiences; they do not show how widespread the same dynamics are across the sample.

The survey also comes at a consequential moment for organisations exposed to international development finance. Several respondents report donor withdrawals, terminated externally financed programmes and growing uncertainty. This coincides with a sharp contraction in official development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, providing an important backdrop to the findings on project dependence, funding cycles, reserves and expectations for the coming year. +

Financial pressure, however, is only one part of the story. Respondents continue to report substantial policy engagement while identifying fundraising, adaptability, communications and strategic planning among their most pressing capacity needs. They are also rapidly adopting artificial intelligence.

Against this backdrop, the report asks: How are sub-Saharan African think tanks sustaining policy relevance while navigating a more uncertain funding and operating environment?

Five findings help answer this question.

3. What the 2026 survey reveals

The survey points to a notable combination of continued policy relevance and growing institutional pressure. The findings below examine this tension through policy engagement, financial resilience, agenda-setting, organisational capabilities, and artificial intelligence.

Finding 1. Policy relevance remains strong

The organisations surveyed continue to report substantial engagement with public policy. Ninety-two per cent say they contributed directly to a specific policy or public debate during the previous year, while 64% are satisfied or very satisfied with their influence on decision-makers.

Figure 1: Policy relevance among surveyed organisations

Source: OTT’s survey (2026)

Respondents describe contributions to concrete policy processes across several sectors.

In Benin, CERRHUD reported serving as executive secretariat and technical contributor to a Ministry of Health taskforce focused on reducing maternal and infant mortality. In Senegal, a respondent linked its contribution to prioritising primary healthcare. A respondent from Mali cited involvement in the national strategy for preventing violent extremism. In Côte d’Ivoire, organisations cited contributions to domestic-resource mobilisation, carbon-tax policy, and the 2026–2030 National Development Plan. In South Africa, MISTRA described its Coalition Barometer as contributing to political discussions on coalition governance.

These examples give substance to the quantitative result and show the range of policy fields in which respondents operate.

Their target audiences are consistent with this orientation. 92% of respondents target the public sector, alongside the academic and research community (90%) and donors and philanthropic organisations (86%). Policy briefs and written research products are produced by 92%, while 96% report public or educational events.

These results should nevertheless be interpreted with care. The survey records organisations’ own assessments. It does not independently measure the scale, durability or causal effect of their contributions. The finding is therefore best understood as evidence of strong self-reported policy engagement and perceived influence.

This pattern is consistent with wider work on African think tanks. Recent World Bank analysis highlights their potential to contribute to national and regional policymaking while also emphasising that influence depends on relationships, institutional positioning and the wider policy environment in which evidence is produced and used. +

The significance of the survey result therefore lies not only in the level of reported policy engagement. It also raises a sustainability question: can organisations maintain this policy role when the institutional foundations supporting it are under growing pressure?

Finding 2. The funding shock is exposing structural vulnerability

Funding is the strongest pressure emerging from the survey. Half of respondents expect the funding environment over the next 12 months to be unfavourable or very unfavourable, and lack of funding remains their most frequently cited organisational challenge.

These concerns affect organisations whose funding models already provide limited room to absorb shocks.

Fifty-six per cent rely predominantly or almost entirely on project-based funding, compared with 34% using a mixed model and only 10% receiving predominantly core funding. Funding cycles are also short: 46% report contracts of one to two years and 32% of two to four years. No respondent reports a typical cycle exceeding four years.

Figure 2: Funding model and typical contract duration

Source: OTT’s survey (2026)

Short and earmarked grants can constrain investment in functions that are difficult to attach to individual projects. These include organisational development, staff retention, fundraising, management systems and longer-term research agendas.

Financial buffers are also limited. Forty-two per cent report difficulty covering indirect costs, while 24% have no financial reserves. Another 18% have reserves covering less than three months of operations, and 40% report reserves of three to six months.                                     

Figure 3: Limited institutional buffers

Source: OTT’s survey (2026)

International financing remains important. Foreign foundations are cited as a source of funding by 78% of respondents, multilateral organisations by 70% and foreign governments by 50%. This does not imply uniform dependence on external donors, but it does indicate substantial exposure to changes in international development finance.

That exposure has become more consequential. OECD estimates indicate a sharp decline in bilateral net official development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa in 2025, with further contraction projected for 2026. These external trends do not explain every organisation’s funding experience, but they reinforce the significance of the funding uncertainty reported in the survey.

Several respondents experiencing declining funding explicitly connect the change to donor withdrawals or cuts. Organisations in Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, and Kenya cite terminated USAID-funded programmes, reduced development assistance, and lost or scaled-back grants.

The broader sustainability challenge is also receiving institutional attention. The Africa Think Tank Platform, implemented by the African Union Commission with funding and support from the World Bank, combines support for policy-relevant research with a sustainability component that includes resource mobilisation and exploration of longer-term financing mechanisms. This signals wider recognition that the resilience of African policy research organisations depends on more than individual project grants. +

Francophone West Africa lens

Funding pressure appears particularly pronounced among the ten respondents from Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger and Senegal. Eight out of ten (80%) identify lack of funding as a major challenge, compared with 66% across the full sub-Saharan African sample.

All ten use project grants as a funding channel. This does not mean that all rely predominantly on project-based funding. The distinction matters: using project grants is different from having project finance as the dominant funding model.

Nevertheless, the results suggest substantial exposure to project finance among these respondents at a time of growing uncertainty in external development funding.

This Francophone West Africa lens is based on ten organisations: three from Benin, three from Senegal, two from Côte d’Ivoire, one from Mali and one from Niger. The findings are indicative and should not be interpreted as representative of the sub-region.

Respondents are not passive in the face of these pressures. The most frequently reported responses to uncertainty are reducing operating costs (30%), seeking new partnerships (28%) and diversifying funding sources (22%).

Organisations from Benin and Burundi describe stronger proposal development, institutional positioning, relationship building and deliberate diversification. These responses point to organisational agency. Yet the capability required to adapt is itself under pressure: fundraising is the most frequently cited capacity need, identified by 84% of respondents.

The survey therefore points to a structural issue, not merely a temporary funding downturn. Recent pressures are interacting with features already embedded in many respondents’ financing models: short cycles, dependence on project finance, difficulty covering indirect costs and limited reserves.

The shock did not create these vulnerabilities; it is exposing and intensifying them.

Finding 3. Research agendas sit at the intersection of policy demand and funding availability

The survey suggests that research agendas are shaped by public-policy demand and resource availability, rather than by any single actor category.

At the national level, government bodies are most frequently ranked first in shaping the research and policy agenda (42%), followed by policymakers (30%). When organisations consider their own agendas, the ranking changes slightly: policymakers are most frequently ranked first (36%), followed by government bodies (30%) and funders (18%).

Table 1: Who most strongly shapes research and policy agendas?

Percentages refer to respondents ranking the actor first.

This pattern complicates a simple narrative in which donors primarily determine research priorities. Public actors rank highest in respondents’ assessments of agenda influence.

Yet resources matter strongly. When respondents identify factors shaping the national research and policy agenda, 88% cite funding availability, 80% cite political shifts, and 72% each cite policy needs and stakeholder demands. At the organisational level, 84% cite funding availability, 82% cite policy needs, and 78% cite stakeholder demands.

Figure 4: What shapes research agendas?

Source: OTT’s survey (2026)

This distinction matters: who influences an agenda is not the same as what conditions the issues organisations can pursue.

Government institutions and policymakers may identify policy problems, generate demand for evidence and open opportunities for engagement. Funding availability affects whether organisations have the resources to respond, sustain a research line or invest in topics that do not fit existing funding windows.

Qualitative responses reinforce this interpretation. In Benin, an organisation highlighted scientific evidence gaps, implementation challenges and opportunities to influence evidence-informed policy. Respondents from Côte d’Ivoire referred to Agenda 2063, the SDGs and the National Development Plan. A South African respondent highlighted structural megatrends such as demography, AI and climate change.

These examples suggest that priorities emerge from several sources at once: policy problems, development frameworks, structural transformations, stakeholder expectations and funding opportunities.

This interaction between actors, incentives and resources also appears in wider analyses of African evidence systems. Political-economy work emphasises that governments, funders, research organisations and other actors exercise different forms of influence. Formal authority, financing incentives and institutional priorities can operate simultaneously rather than through a single linear pathway. +

The survey does not demonstrate that tighter funding is reducing research independence. Such a causal conclusion would go beyond the evidence. It does show, however, that funding availability is deeply embedded in respondents’ understanding of how agendas form.

The resulting tension is therefore subtler than a choice between independence and donor influence. Respondents seek to remain responsive to policy needs while operating within a resource environment that shapes what they can realistically pursue.

Finding 4. Capacity gaps are becoming a question of institutional resilience

The capacity needs reported by respondents extend beyond technical research skills. They increasingly concern the organisational functions that enable think tanks to mobilise resources, adapt to uncertainty and sustain their work.

The leading capacity need is fundraising, identified by 84% of respondents. It is followed by innovation and adaptability (72%), communications and marketing (70%), strategic planning (66%), research capacity (58%) and financial management (44%).

Figure 5: Priority capacity needs

Source: OTT’s survey (2026)

Fundraising is especially significant when read alongside the financial findings. Respondents are not only reporting a harder funding environment; they are also identifying resource mobilisation as the capacity they most need to strengthen.

The other priorities point in the same direction. Adaptability, communications and strategic planning all shape how organisations respond to change. Research capacity remains important, but it is not the only priority, or the highest-ranked one.

Open-text responses add nuance. South African respondents separately highlighted managing disruption and monitoring, evaluation and donor-report writing. A Kenyan respondent explicitly raised the issue of reserves.

Reported challenges reinforce this interpretation. 66% cited lack of funding for the previous 12 months and 68% for the next 12 months. Skills shortages remain at 56% for both periods. Concern about the political context rises from 34% for the past year to 48% for the next 12 months.

Figure 6: Main challenges: past vs ahead

Source: OTT’s survey (2026)

This compares two time horizons within the same 2026 survey and should not be read as a longitudinal trend.

Francophone West Africa lens

Capacity pressures appear stronger on some dimensions among the ten Francophone West African respondents. Seventy per cent identify a shortage of staff with the necessary skills as a major challenge, compared with 56% across the full sub-Saharan African sample. Funding pressure is also prominent, with 80% citing lack of funding.

Given the small sample, these differences should not be treated as evidence of a systematic gap between Francophone West Africa and the rest of the region. They do, however, reinforce the broader finding that resilience depends on both resources and the ability to retain the skills needed to produce research, engage policymakers and adapt to change.

Overall, the pattern suggests that capacity strengthening increasingly needs to be viewed through the lens of institutional resilience: the ability to mobilise resources, maintain key skills and functions, adjust strategies and continue operating under uncertainty.

This broader interpretation is consistent with approaches emerging from Africa’s evidence community. The Africa Evidence Network’s Manifesto on Capacity Development for Evidence-Informed Decision-Making in Africa argues for moving beyond narrow, deficit-based approaches to capacity building. It places greater emphasis on African leadership, contextual relevance, collaboration and the relationships between evidence producers, users and intermediaries. +

The Africa Think Tank Platform also reflects this broader institutional approach. Beyond funding individual research outputs, the initiative seeks to strengthen the quality, relevance and uptake of policy research as well as the sustainability of the structures supporting African think tanks. +

This does not make conventional capacity development irrelevant. Research, communications, financial management and technical expertise remain essential. But strengthening them in isolation may be less effective than linking them to broader organisational systems.

A useful distinction therefore emerges between capacity to deliver projects and capacity to sustain an institution. An organisation may implement individual projects successfully while still lacking the financial buffers, diversified resources or staffing stability required to withstand a major shock.

Finding 5. AI adoption is widespread, but concentrated in day-to-day knowledge work

Respondents already use artificial intelligence widely. Eighty-four per cent report using AI, indicating that adoption has moved beyond experimentation for much of the sample.

The leading areas of use are research (66%), communications (62%) and administration (52%). Only 26% report using AI for fundraising. These percentages use the full sub-Saharan African sample (n=50) as the denominator; 42 respondents reported using AI.

Figure 7: Where surveyed organisations are using AI

Source: OTT’s survey (2026)

Note: Percentages for AI areas of use use the full sub-Saharan African sample (n=50) as the denominator; 42 respondents reported using AI.

Francophone West Africa lens

AI uptake is particularly striking among the ten Francophone West African respondents: all ten report using artificial intelligence, compared with 84% across the full sub-Saharan African sample.

This does not establish that the sub-region is more digitally advanced. The sample is too small to draw that conclusion. It does, however, show that technological uptake is not lagging among these respondents.

The result is especially interesting when read alongside the same group’s stronger funding and skills pressures. It illustrates a central tension in the report: rapid technological adaptation can coexist with substantial institutional constraints.

The tools used across the broader sample reinforce the focus on day-to-day knowledge work. Grammar and writing-improvement tools are reported by 70%, note-taking and meeting-assistant tools by 68%, chatbots by 50%, and image, video or sound-generation tools by 40%.

Respondents mention document review, proposal preparation, training support, teaching, large language models and machine-learning applications. These uses mainly support drafting, synthesis, content production and research processes.

The survey does not measure whether AI improves productivity, research quality, cost efficiency or financial resilience. AI adoption should therefore not be presented as either solving or failing to solve institutional challenges that it did not directly measure.

The data do show that current use is concentrated more in knowledge-production and operational functions than in fundraising, even though fundraising is respondents’ highest-ranked capacity need.

This distinction reflects a broader debate about AI in developing economies. The World Development Report 2026 argues that AI’s potential benefits depend not only on access to tools but also on complementary capabilities such as skills, infrastructure, institutions, and appropriate governance. For think tanks, adoption is therefore only one part of the transition; organisational integration matters as well.

Responses from some non-users reinforce this point. Organisations in Ghana and Kenya cite institutional caution and the lack of, or ongoing development of, internal AI policies. These cases suggest that the next stage of adoption may depend on rules governing confidentiality, quality assurance, transparency and human oversight.

The implication is not that technological adoption should slow. Rather, AI needs to connect to organisational priorities, appropriate governance, and wider institutional systems.

4. What needs to change

Taken together, the five findings point to a common conclusion. The organisations surveyed do not primarily appear to face a crisis of policy relevance. Many remain connected to policy processes and are adapting quickly. The more persistent challenge concerns the institutional conditions that sustain this relevance.

The survey does not prescribe a single model for strengthening think tanks. However, short funding cycles, limited buffers, high fundraising needs, skills constraints and rapid technological change suggest several priorities.

4.1 For think tanks: build resilience beyond the next project

Think tanks need to reduce the gap between successful project delivery and institutional sustainability.

Fundraising should become a permanent strategic function rather than an activity intensified only when current grants approach their end. Diversification can help, but it needs stronger financial management, cost recovery, and attention to reserves.

The findings also support a more integrated approach to institutional development. Fundraising, adaptability, communications, strategic planning and talent management are interconnected. Strengthening them together can help organisations anticipate change, mobilise resources and adjust without losing sight of their mission.

AI adds another institutional requirement. As adoption expands, organisations need clear internal approaches to appropriate use, confidentiality, verification, transparency and human judgement.

4.2 For funders: strengthen the institutions behind the outputs

The findings also raise questions about how policy research organisations are financed.

Short project cycles may successfully fund individual studies or outputs while leaving the institutional capacities behind them underfunded. Difficulty covering indirect costs and limited reserves illustrate this tension.

The implication is not to abandon project funding or accountability requirements. It is to seek a better balance between project accountability and institutional sustainability.

Longer funding horizons, greater flexibility where appropriate and realistic treatment of indirect costs can help organisations retain expertise, maintain core systems and respond to emerging policy opportunities.

Supporting institutional capabilities alongside outputs may therefore help preserve organisations that respondents themselves report as already producing policy value.

4.3 For ecosystem actors: support adaptation at the system level

Networks, capacity-development organisations, universities, research councils, policy platforms and other ecosystem actors can complement what individual think tanks and funders do.

High demand for fundraising, innovation, communications and strategic planning creates scope for longer-term peer learning, coaching and access to specialised expertise. These approaches may be more useful than relying only on isolated training activities.

Shared approaches can also reduce adaptation costs. Organisations could benefit from joint intelligence on funding opportunities, regulatory changes and organisational practices, especially where smaller institutions cannot maintain specialised business-development or technology teams.

AI governance is another potential area for collective support. Think tanks face similar questions around confidentiality, quality assurance and responsible use. Shared principles and peer exchange could reduce duplication while supporting experimentation.

Ecosystem actors can also strengthen dialogue between evidence producers and policy institutions, helping to preserve the relationships on which policy engagement depends.

4.4 Sustaining relevance requires stronger foundations

The 2026 survey portrays organisations that adapt rather than stand still. They report making policy contributions, responding to changing priorities, and adopting new technologies.

Yet adaptability alone cannot compensate for short funding horizons, limited financial buffers and persistent institutional constraints.

Preserving policy relevance increasingly requires strengthening the institutions that make that relevance possible. For think tanks, this means investing in resilience alongside research excellence. For funders, it means recognising the institutional infrastructure behind high-quality evidence and policy engagement. For ecosystem actors, it means strengthening shared capacities that individual organisations may struggle to build alone.

The challenge is not simply to help think tanks do more. It is to ensure that organisations already contributing to public policy can continue to do so under greater financial, political and technological uncertainty.

Methodological note

This report analyses responses from 50 sub-Saharan African organisations participating in OTT’s 2026 State of the Sector survey. The global survey comprises 299 respondents.

The findings are descriptive and should not be interpreted as statistically representative of the think tank sector in sub-Saharan Africa. They reflect the experiences and perceptions reported by participating organisations.

For multiple-response questions, percentages may exceed 100%. Qualitative responses illustrate and contextualise quantitative findings and do not indicate the prevalence of a particular experience across the full sample.

The Francophone West Africa lens draws on ten respondents from Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger and Senegal. These results are indicative and are not representative of the sub-region as a whole.