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This article was written as part of the publication of the 2024 On Think Tanks State of the Sector Report. Explore the report and resources here.
The State of the Sector 2024 is out. The report, which canvasses the responses of nearly 300 different think tanks around the world, provides a global overview of trends shaping the sector. In this article, I focus on the specific trends that the survey has identified in the EU/EFTA, as well as in non-EU countries and the South Caucasus. I also highlight some more anecdotal developments that think tank watchers should be aware of.
The think tank landscape
The think tank landscape of the old continent, as Europeans like to call themselves, is stable, with no tectonic shifts in the number, size and relevance of think tanks. This conclusion holds true across the two sub-regions, with think tanks of all sizes, from under $100,000 to over $5 million, responding to the survey.
Despite the overall stability of the sector, the emergence of an impactful radical right think tank should be noted. MCC – Mathias Corvinus Collegium, a nominally independent think tank but heavily sponsored by the Hungarian government riding on the $1.7 billion it received from the Hungarian government in 2021 and opening an office in Brussels in November 2022, became very visible and effective in 2024. Its lavish funding, ambitious agenda and lobbying for the interests of the Hungarian government are also notable for their political merits. In the context of our interest in think tanks, its work is noteworthy because it represents the first conservative think tank in Europe that is fully modelled on US conservative think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation.
Its funding has allowed it to cast a wide net of international contacts and influence based on radical right ideology and often in denial of data and evidence. It will be crucial to monitor the success of this influence in the coming years, as it could be copied by the much larger radical right parties such as the Brothers of Italy and Ressemblement National in France. Interestingly, the latter already runs Campus Hemera to educate its members, which is very similar to the MCC’s work as an educational institution. These developments would create a different landscape and style of work for think tanks closely linked to the radical right political spectrum. While the size of these new think tanks would not overwhelm the entire sector, the aggressive style of engagement and the way in which these think tanks, like the political parties they serve, influence the sector could have an outsized impact.
These think tanks, like the politicians they support, do not engage in objective, evidence-based research; they attend conferences to promote their talking points and ideological positions, not to debate or discuss other points of view or policy alternatives. As such, they pose a fundamental threat to the culture that the others have been building for decades. Ignoring them worked when they represented a minority of the electorate and political representatives. However, this strategy cannot work when a significant part of the population follows what they do or say. Moreover, Trump’s recent election will only further embolden this type of think tanks across Europe. Progressive, evidence-based think tanks will immediately have to find new, innovative, communications-savvy ways to engage this new audience while not allowing them to hijack the stage and exposing their often flawed reasoning (perhaps a topic for another piece).
Political context
The data show that think tanks in both the EU/EFTA and non-EU/South Caucasus regions say they have the freedom to conduct independent research. However, they also report increasing political polarisation, with only a few in the low teens saying they are not affected at all and a significant increase in the number of moderately affected in both regions. These regions are also the most pessimistic about future political prospects, with 45% and 47% of respondents in the sub-regions, respectively, expecting an unfavourable political situation. The example of GLOBSEC, a think tank based in Bratislava, and the general phenomenon of increasing self-censorship among think tanks in the major capitals of Western Europe illustrates this trend well.
In 2024, GLOBSEC moved its GLOBSEC Forum from Bratislava to Prague. While the official reason given was regional outreach, the public secret is that the forum, which is second only to the famous Munich Security Conference in its importance as a key vehicle for debates on security and foreign policy in Europe, moved because of political pressure from and political incompatibility with the Slovak government. While government pressure on think tanks in the eastern part of the EU is not new, with the former Polish and current Hungarian governments being the main perpetrators, this move was the biggest sign of pressure since these countries joined the EU in 2024.
The second observation relates to how the current political context and pessimistic outlook for the future could lead to a wave of self-censorship in the EU/EFTA region. The data show that almost 70% of the budgets of think tanks working in high-income countries, including EU/EFTA, come from within their borders, which is a good sign for a healthy domestic market. However, in the EU/EFTA, where the state budgets are significant supporters of think tanks, this support could risk becoming a liability in times of increased political instability.
On the technical side, most funding is project-based and usually short-term, which increases the risks of dependency on funding from a particular government ministry or budget line. On the political side, many progressive, liberal-minded, pro-democracy politicians have become weary of criticism in the face of constant attacks on their policies. This makes them less receptive to reports that are critical of their performance and to policy recommendations that are not in line with their set agenda. This phenomenon, if it continues, risks further shrinking the space for influence in Western Europe as think tanks, fearful of losing funding, become more cautious and calculated in their recommendations. It is not surprising that 72% of think tanks identify adaptability as a key challenge, as such negative developments could have a profound impact on the quality of their interventions. Adaptability in its worst form could lead to a loss of the critical perspectives they have provided in the past. With the emergence of more ideological think tanks that do not engage in the proper debates mentioned above, some progressive think tanks may become predominantly defenders of liberal credos rather than fostering healthy political and policy debates.
Funding patterns
The funding patterns in these two sub-regions are not surprising.
- In the EU/EFTA, government funding and private donations play an important role, while in the non-EU/South Caucasus, aid remains the main source of funding.
- In the EU/EFTA, three respondents reported only core funding, eight reported mainly core funding, and 24 reported a mixed funding model.
This means that more than half of the participating think tanks rely on a mixed funding model, contributing to their long-term sustainability. And, logically, they have more staff on long-term contracts. The report shows that those with this kind of stability are the most influential think tanks.
On the flip side, one particularly vulnerable category is those think tanks that have predominantly project-based funding, as they are dependent on government funding. As mentioned above, this dependence brings with it the risk of self-censorship as well as large fluctuations in budgets that depend on government funding.
One particular aspect to highlight in the data is the difficulty of setting up a think tank in the region, with only 1 in 5 respondents finding it easy. This can easily be linked to the overall culture of the sector and the donor myth that ‘the older think tank is better’. As a result, the threshold for starting a think tank is high, forcing young, talented researchers and think tankers to join existing think tanks instead of trying to create their own brand. The non-EU and South Caucasus sub-region, despite the political difficulties, is a more fertile ground for establishing new think tanks, with almost 70% of respondents answering this question moderately easy to very easy. Given that most of the funding comes from international organisations, it also shows that they are more willing to take risks than their governments, which fund think tanks at home.
Research priorities and impact
In terms of audiences for their work, think tanks in the EU/EFTA and non-EU/South Caucasus align with their global peers, with the public sector being their main audience. However, in contrast to others, more than one in two think tankers surveyed find that their government and policymakers set the research agenda. A particularly interesting data point is the positive view that think tankers in these regions have of the receptiveness of the traditional media, with over 70% in both regions saying that the media is moderately to very receptive to their work. Somewhat surprisingly, in the non-EU/South Caucasus region, 57% of respondents find the media very receptive or receptive to their work. This clearly indicates that the public channels for policy influence are alive and being used by think tanks in these two regions, in addition to the informal channels used simultaneously by more than 90% of the responding think tanks.
Challenges and emerging trends
The rich data on DEI and the challenges of leadership transition in the main SOS 2024 report is also worth reading for this region. Here, I would like to focus on one specific point from this section: the low penetration of AI use among think tanks in these two sub-regions. The data, which shows that only 19% of respondents frequently use AI for research, suggests that the sector is certainly not an early adopter of this fundamental advancement. While AI has yet to become a clearly defined tool for advancing research, it is worrying that think tanks with access to data in high-income countries in Europe are not using it more. This alone would merit a deeper dive and exploration of how to motivate think tanks to be at the forefront of AI experimentation rather than late adopters.
In conclusion, the data show that think tanks produce a vast number of technical and political solutions to the problems they seek to solve. What is less certain is how they will be able to recommend ways forward in an increasingly fragmented and polarised political system. This is important not only for their countries and the region in general but also for the survival and continued success of the sector.