GREATER POLICY IMPACT: STRONGER POST-PROJECT ENGAGEMENT

by Raymond J. Struyk

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Introduction

Think tanks exist to improve the quality of decisions made by governments at all levels. Most are rightly concerned about their image as an organization that demonstrably contributes to development of strong policies and programs for its country. Considerable resources are devoted to documenting performance.¹ The policy community and sponsors both pay attention to think tanks’ own assessments as well as such external reviews as may be available.

Still, it may be that many think tanks have less success in the policy arena than they could. Limited tracking of post-project policy development opportunities and limited follow through where additional data or analysis could be effective restrict think tanks’ influence.

For a policy research project to realize success generally requires going beyond adequately fulfilling the TOR of a government contract, aid agency support, or foundation grant—or even going well beyond funders’ expectations in meeting this standard. Most significant policy effects take a long time to realize, certainly well beyond the delivery date for a policy research project’s deliverables, often years. Usually projects end before the real “policy marketing” begins. Research sponsors want your products to use in crafting and selling the new policy or in reforming/strengthening an existing policy based on evidence about its effectiveness. Rarely is there a task for work with the agency to advance the proposed policy change within government. Sponsors see this as their task, the payoff from designing, commissioning, and overseeing policy research projects.² Of course, think tanks’ communications campaigns can be very helpful in alerting the policy community to the issue, educating them about it, and highlighting proposals for addressing it—a very important initial step. They are also likely to give sponsors detailed briefings about their work—an additional positive step.

Experience shows that the policy development process in the majority of countries moves at a deliberate pace. Yes, there are exceptions: think of how quickly major program changes were adopted and implemented in the first couple of years in former Soviet bloc countries just after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Also, certain authoritarian governments can move at lightning speed. But as Fred Bergsten, founding president of the Petersen Institute and a person very experienced in moving policy ideas in international finance forward, said it requires “ten years from inception of an idea to implementation of an idea.”³

Consider the actions involved to advance a proposed program change developed through a research government agency funded project that requires parliamentary approval. The path would be something like the following: at the responsible ministry the proposed policy change passes from the office that commissioned the research completed by the think tank to

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¹. There are many approaches to trying to measure a think tank’s influence in policy development, ranging from the comparatively simple to those that involve a series of studies and significant resources. An overview of issues involved is presented in Politics and Ideas (2013b) and in Summer et al. (2009). Weyrauch, D’Agostino, and Richards (2011) have prepared a handbook on organizing a comprehensive research-to-policy M&E program. CIPPEC in Argentina has also produced a very useful set of toolkits on carrying out these analyses. Hovland (2007) provides an overview of methods for evaluating an institution’s performance. On two specific tools, i.e., “Most Significant Change” and “Outcome Mapping,” see Davies and Dart (2005) and Earl, Carden, and Smutylo (2001), respectively.

². One exception in my experience are awards for writing books where post-publication marketing activities are funded.

³. As reported in Selee (2013, 7).
the program office division director; then it goes to the
office director, to the
deputy minister, to the
minister; and then to the
ministry of finance for its assessment and approval; and on to the
office of the president (which may have several levels).

If it is included in the next year’s budget, it is submitted to parliament and works its way through committees of both houses for consideration and modification; and then finally to each full chamber for action. If enacted, the originating ministry has the task of preparing the program’s regulations to permit implementation. At almost any point in the initiative’s journey additional explanations and information may be essential from the ministry, often meaning the proposal is returned to the ministry for modification. (Such modifications are frequently requested in response to objections raised by stakeholders outside government.) The foregoing makes it easy to see how years can pass on the way from a proposed reform to an improved functioning program.

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To be effective a think tank needs to stay involved in the policy process after the final report is released, the roll out conference held, and the social media blitz mounted. If this is not done, then the impact of the Institute’s work may be underestimated because it is unaware of changes it helped cause. Beyond this there can be two other, probably more important, missed opportunities. First, if there is little continued tracking, then Center Directors/Team Leaders (hereafter Team Leaders) and Principal Investigators (PIs) may be unaware of distinct chances to provide additional or clarifying information important to advancing a reform—after all, they know more about the specifics of the data, the analysis, and what is behind the recommendations than anyone else. Second, the think tank is not building a corpus of experience on effective post-project actions that could be shared with other team leaders.

The reality, of course, is that resources are needed to follow policy developments and identify opportunities in any area. All think tanks face budget constraints and PIs usually are substantially occupied with managing the next project and writing another proposal. It is essential, therefore, that a think tank assess which policy projects or programs warrant the resource investment for tracking and, where appropriate, additional participation in the policy process. With that decision in hand, the second decision is about who is to lead the post-project monitoring and craft any follow-up action plans that may be needed. An obvious question is what is senior management’s role in all of this.

As obviously important such persistent involvement in the policy process can be in achieving actual changes, there seems to little direct discussion of it in the think tank management literature. The topic is missing, for example, from some very useful communications guides developed specifically for think tanks.4

This article is about how a think tank identifies which of those policy areas that have been the subject of major projects deserve to be actively monitored in the future as targets for deeper policy involvement. Equally important is the question of organizing the monitoring and learning from the results for future monitoring and intervention activities.

4. For example, the Results for Development Institute (2014) produced a very good communications guide for think tanks. It, like many similar documents, includes only the monitoring and evaluation of the communications activities among post project tasks. It does not discuss possible post project substantive follow-up and the possible role of the communications team in them.
In preparing this article I consulted with senior managers at three think tanks I view as well-managed: the Urban Institute, the Results for Development Institute, and the Institute for Urban Economics. The first two are large organizations (measured by staff size, headcounts of 150 and 500+) both located in the U.S. The last is in Russia with a staff of about 35, although its management practices were developed when its head count was around 100.\(^5\) Below they are referred to as participating think tanks.

The discussion proceeds in five parts. The first looks at the selection of which completed projects should be actively monitored and when to make the decision on this for individual projects. The second part presents a description of how such involvement actually is carried out. The third part discusses the important roles senior management has to play in marshalling resources and advising the “policy entrepreneurs” who are actually working with various stakeholders to achieve acceptance of the new policy. The fourth section overviews what the participating think tanks now have in place for tracking and responding to opportunities identified. The last section briefly concludes.

On a first reading the activities involved in the tracking-contributing paradigm may be daunting. A couple of points can be held in mind to allay a sense of “it’s just too much.” Actually, one of the participating think tanks already has in-place an operating structure very similar to that being suggested and they do not find it burdensome. Another point is that in starting to implement a tracking system an element-by-element process can be used in which not all tasks are included from the outset and only one or two of a think tank’s research centers lead the way and share their experience with others. Finally, what are described below as separate tasks are closely related with each requiring fewer resources to launch than may seem likely at first.

Lastly, the presentation below in places is somewhat didactic and probably simplistic. The hope is that these faults purchase clarity about the basic tasks to be done. There are many ways to do them and various think tanks will adopt different methods.

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5. I sincerely thank Margery Austin Turner, Courtney Tolmie, and Tatiana Polidi for their extensive cooperation and openness in describing their organizations’ practices and exploring other options with me for this post.
Which programs to track

As indicated, resources—particularly time of key staff—are required to monitor developments in the policy areas where the think tank has made recommendations. Conceptually, the decision about tracking depends on (a) the cost of the tracking and providing additional inputs to the policy’s or program’s refinement, and (b) the expected societal gains from a new program or reformed program being realized.

Conceptually, the expected value of the gain is

\[ E(G) = \text{probability of the change being approved and implemented} \times \text{the size of the change produced by the new or modified program.} \]

As an example, take the case of improving the administration of a program that provides food vouchers or food stamps to the poor. Analysts working in the area can give their estimates of the chance that the recommended change will actually be accepted by the government and legislature. The size of the change in this case is the savings in administrative costs per recipient and the increase in the number of beneficiaries effected, including additional beneficiaries who can now be served thanks to the savings from improved applicant screening that the research shows will qualify a higher share for participation.

Costs of tracking developments vary depending on where the specific policy reform fits into the think tank’s work program. At least three cases can be distinguished. The first is that the project that developed the recommended change is part of a large ongoing program in this policy area. This means that there is frequent contact between institute senior staff and senior administrators and others involved with the program. The marginal cost of inquiring about developments of any specific initiative will be low.

The second case is when the think tank’s program is routinely informed by the agency of possible program changes. A good example is the work of the Tax Policy Center’s work in the U.S. The mission of the Center, a joint undertaking of the Urban Institute and the Brookings Institution, is to analyze proposed changes in the national personal income tax and corporate income tax. The involved government agencies inform it of proposed changes so the effects of the changes can be simulated with an elaborate model developed for the purpose. Hence the Center is well informed of proposals and it has excellent working contacts within the relevant government agencies. Tracking costs are very low. The participating think tanks indicate that this is the type of tracking opportunities they most often pursue, but such programs are quite rare.

The third case is a one-off project in an area in which the think tank does not often work. Monitoring costs are higher here because contacts may have to be specially initiated with knowledgeable people in various actively involved organizations. (This is discussed in the next section.) This makes the tracking relatively expensive.

Other factors can enter the decision making, such as whether the area is one where the institute wants to raise its profile, including becoming better known so that it can more effectively compete for future work. The higher costs may be worth it if the organization wants to become effective in this new area.
My sense is that in reality few think tanks have an explicit process for deciding which projects’ implementation to track after completion. Indeed, the tracking that is done is often the decision of a team leader or single senior analyst who has a strong interest in a sector, understands how its decision process works, and has over time developed the necessary contacts to gather information informally. This is fine as far as it goes. But there is little assurance that the breadth of such “spontaneous” coverage will be adequate or include the issues more important to the institute overall.

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How to track developments?

Tracking is a task for “insiders,” i.e., those who have working professional contacts among the various actors involved in advancing policy ideas through the executive and legislative branches and beyond. It is essential that the think tank obtains information on changes under discussion or being floated informally so it can contribute analysis based on concluded and possible new analysis in a timely way.

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The first three–four months after an organization delivers a final report that recommends program changes or a new program are frequently a crucial period for judging the reception the recommendations receive. If interest is shown, then this is the time for the team leader and management to discuss if the progress of the initiative should be actively monitored so that the institute can offer advice where appropriate.

Of course, the common case is that someone with a lead role in the research takes it upon herself to follow developments. Her actions are typically undertaken quietly and privately. When there is a major development, a mention to her superior is given. In short, the usual case is for a policy entrepreneur to follow–up using contacts she has developed over years.

The problem with this approach is that such entrepreneurs are a small share of senior researchers. (A senior vice–president at a major think tank once told me that he thought only about 5 percent of his senior researchers were truly entrepreneurial in this way. Since then several others have concurred with this estimate.) A think tank that relies on the existence of such actors for systematic tracking and exploitation of policy opportunities is likely to be missing some of them.

An example drawn from practices in the U.S. at the national level will help clarify how an entrepreneur operates to stay informed. There are four major actors in the policy development process:

- Government ministries and agencies who are tasked with developing new policies and programs or improving existing ones they manage; usually each program area is overseen by an assistant minister; she is supported by the assistant minister for policy development and related research;
- The Congress which must pass an implementing law for new or revised programs and appropriate the funds for the program’s operations; the Congress has a very large staff including technical experts among those who work for the committees of Members of Congress that address various policy areas;
- The Office of the President has two roles. First, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), is responsible for overseeing the development of the annual budget including making recommendations to the president on ministries’ proposals of new programs being created and existing ones improved...
usually through revised regulations; 6 OMB follows an evidence-based decision process in its rigorous review of proposals. Second, various offices advising the President make the political decisions about the programs; and,

- Public interest groups (PIGs), usually NGOs, who work to obtain government support for their members. For example, in the housing sphere, there are PIGs that work to improve and expand programs directed at providing adequate and affordable housing for low income families and other PIGs that support legal changes that would benefit homebuilders, among others.

Other countries have arrangements that are often structurally broadly similar. One distinction is that in most countries the Ministry of Finance has the role assigned to OMB in the U.S.

A policy entrepreneur benefits from contacts in each of these groups to be able to track progress in proposed programmatic changes. This is predominantly done on an informal, casual basis: phone calls, lunches, conversations on the sidelines at conferences, some emailing. Clearly this kind of network is built up over years and tends to be highly personal. People are exchanging information often on a privileged basis.

In short, follow-up is active, not passive. A researcher-entrepreneur checks with her contacts a couple of times a year when nothing exceptional is happening. When major legislation is under consideration or an agency is drafting a regulation important for the entrepreneur’s policy interests, contacts are often more frequent. If the researcher has significant new findings or policy ideas to contribute to the discussion, she may be asked to testify before a Congressional committee or to meet a senior official at the relevant ministry. These policy conversations are highly substantive—two very well-informed people exchanging information. Think tankers provide technical, not political, advice.

If one side does not deliver substantially to a partner in a couple of interactions, the intensity of interactions will likely decline.

6. It is often the case that the budget changes from revised regulations are small. But this is not always the case. Think of regulatory changes that sharply increase food inspections. This could mean hiring a large number of new inspectors—probably a significant increase in the agency’s budget.
Tasks for senior management

An implication of the description of the policy-entrepreneur is that these are enterprising, experienced researchers with a strong taste for the give-and-take of the messy, typically rather chaotic policy development process. My sense is that at many think tanks they operate quite independently of senior management. Management’s attitude is that as long as they are doing a good job representing the institute, then they should be assisted their activities with work time and certain other support. Giving significant leeway and support to these “stars” certainly makes sense.

Senior management is, of course, significantly involved, at least in the background, in the work of its policy-entrepreneurs. I have yet to find a think tank that has an explicit statement or guidelines about how these entrepreneurs interact with senior managers.

My sense is that some guidance would be useful to both sides with the common goal of the organization being to provide consistently strong advice and having enhanced positive influence on certain of the nation’s policies. I see six areas where “light touch” interactions between the “policy stars” and senior managers is appropriate. These are discussed in turn below. “Senior managers” for this purpose are usually the institute’s president and research director, although others, such as the communications director, could be included. To be sure the stars and senior managers are often the same people but certainly not always. Many think tanks have Senior Fellows who do not want management responsibilities and certainly some of them are stars. One reason that discussions of post-project policy work is essentially absent at many think tanks is because each policy entrepreneur runs her own operation.

First, build relations with others who can promote policy change in your sector, particularly the relevant public interest groups. During project execution work closely with them that share your general policy perspective. These organizations will continue to press for change long after most think tanks have moved on.

Second, work with team leaders and policy-entrepreneurs (if they are different people) in each program area to decide on which policy-influencing opportunities to pursue. As indicated above, a good time for an assessment of recently completed research projects is a few months after completion. This will often be sufficient time for champions of the policy change within the client ministry to have made the case at least initially for its adoption and support and for a reaction from more senior ministry officials.

The probable benefits and costs of active monitoring can be discussed and an initial decision made. If the decision is made to monitor developments, then it makes sense to agree on realistic policy objectives of further
work. A broad outline of the strategy to be followed can be set down. This can be quite simple and certainly need not be rigidly followed (think of a list of bullet points). It can serve as an organizing device and a reminder list for future review sessions. Some rough estimate can also be made of the time that will likely elapse until the decision process concludes, if there is some basis for it.

Third, for the policy influence opportunities that are being pursued, periodic reviews on how much to invest are essential. (Funding possibilities are discussed below.) The reviews cover the institute’s contributions—meaning keeping in contact with the principal actors, contributing new analysis, and drafting position papers. The assessments cover progress to date in the policy proposal being accepted by the relevant government agencies and then the legislature and the outlook for further progress over the next 6–12 months, including resources that may be needed. The team leader and policy-entrepreneur are again the relevant participants along with senior management. This is also the time to discuss options for pursuing the policy changes. These sessions can be quite informal.7

Fourth, input for preparation of the institute’s annual budget is needed on each opportunity actively being pursued and on next year’s horizon. This assessment can be one of the two needed annually to give both those at the institute working directly on the policy change and senior management this key information.

It takes significant time and chances for less experienced research staff to gain the contacts and knowledge to exploit in becoming an entrepreneur. My sense is that development of new entrepreneurs more often than not happens away from think tanks, in part because resident entrepreneurs are not anxious to open their contacts to others and in part because other kinds of institutions have better routine access to the relevant players.

Fifth, grooming new policy-entrepreneurs. It takes significant time and chances for less experienced research staff to gain the contacts and knowledge to exploit in becoming an entrepreneur. My sense is that development of new entrepreneurs more often than not happens away from think tanks, in part because resident entrepreneurs are not anxious to open their contacts to others and in part because other kinds of institutions have better routine access to the relevant players.

I can illustrate the “routine access” point with personal experience. After being a senior researcher at the Urban Institute for six years working on urban housing issues, I had participated in only a half–dozen meetings with housing ministry officials. I had really no idea how to work informally to advance policy positions. But I was then appointed to a senior position at the housing ministry at the beginning of President Carter’s Administration to lead the ministry’s research and program evaluation programs.8 As one can readily imagine my days were packed with meetings around the ministry, with congressional and OMB staff, and people from the public interest groups who wanted information from my group and also some sense of the ministry’s thinking on various issues. After three years when I left the ministry, I understood very well how the process worked and had a long list of active contacts.

Those who spend a few years on a Congressional staff develop contacts with the staffs at ministries for which their principal (the Congressman or Senator) have responsibilities, and also with relevant players in the administration, think tanks that have independent views and analysis to contribute, and certainly with the public interest groups. When such staff move to think tanks, they bring their contact lists and ready access to

7. There is some support for the value of small team-by-team review meetings of this type. All three of the think tanks participating in this project reported that they employ this type of meeting monthly as an effective tool in controlling project cost overruns (Struyk 2018).
8. This was a surprisingly big operation. My office had in today’s dollars a budget of about $200 million annually to commission research from outside organizations and a staff of 125.
various institutions with them. Employment in the program offices in ministries does not usually generate such a degree of interaction with those in other policy spheres but certainly some mixing arises through working on multi-ministry task forces and attending the same conferences.

An important question is whether think tanks should be more proactive in grooming analysts with a deep policy interest to become a policy-entrepreneur. The two cases where action by senior management is important are: where there is not real policy-entrepreneur in a group, including the team leader; and, when the person who has served this function is retiring or moving on.

In the case of moving on, understandably, the person who is a group’s policy-entrepreneur may resist sharing her knowledge and contacts with a newcomer. On the other hand, in the case of succession planning, the current entrepreneur may be more willing to participate in an orderly handover of current work to a new person. But this staff overlapping must be carefully choreographed. If there is more than one person at the think tank with networking responsibilities on an issue, even when the second has a clearly lower status, possibilities for coordination problems exist: the last thing contacts want is to be talking with multiple people from the same organization. Many will not put up with wasting their time this way.

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Where a group lacks a true entrepreneur, senior management needs to work with the team leader to make these talents an important qualification for future hires until the right person is found. My experience is that team leaders are often not natural entrepreneurs and pushing them in this direction is a mistake.

One of the participating think tanks has recently launched a research team restructuring as a complement to finding and hiring additional policy entrepreneurs. It has recognized that a “portfolio of skills” is needed by a team to operate efficiently in the policy development world and the weak ingredient is policy experts. These experts are individuals with relevant training and hands-on experience in policy formulation and implementation, i.e., program design, regulation drafting, overseeing new programs launches, and program evaluation. The change is for analytic teams to contain both technical analytic experts and policy experts. The policy experts can be permanently located in sector-focused analytic teams, e.g., welfare reform, housing, macroeconomics, or in a new group dedicated to the research-to-policy task from which they can join sector teams as needed or do direct consulting to government agencies at all levels. Flexible teams are formed to execute projects and to work on various policy initiatives identified through the post-project monitoring process. The institute has created a career ladder for the policy experts that mirrors the one for analytic experts.

The sixth senior management topic concerns the information these mangers need on a regular basis to broadly monitor the robustness of the institute’s post-project activities. My recommendation is for the lead person for each project follow-on, usually the team leader or the entrepreneur, submit a short narrative quarterly or semi-annually on the status of each post-project policy development agreed to be a target for continued institute activity. For moribund cases a couple of concise paragraphs or less can suffice. For those that appear to be “heating up” after some time for inter-ministry or other issues to be sorted out, a longer statement is needed. If appropriate, it could include proposals for next steps for the institute to take.

At some point for many policy initiatives, where there is little-to-no interest, it will be appropriate to stop tracking altogether.
The seventh task, and possibly the most important, is finding funds to support post-project policy work. For many think tanks this will initially be seen as a very daunting undertaking. But there may be sources at hand which could be exploited. A quick inventory of possibilities is worthwhile.

1. **Endowments.** True, endowments are not common among think tanks but they are certainly not impossible. Two of three participating think tanks have them and use some of the interest income on this capital to support post-project policy work.

2. **Unrestricted funds**, i.e., grants to the institution which are not earmarked to specific activities or, desirable in our case, dedicated to policy work generally or in a particular area. The Center for Global Development in Washington is a good example that has been highly successful in raising such funds.9

3. **Raise funds dedicated for post-project policy use.** One can imagine that many donors would find such requests attractive. Their funds support identified promising opportunities for policy change.

4. **Savings on fixed-price contracts**, i.e., the difference between the agreed payment and the actual costs incurred in executing a project.

5. **Supplemental funds from original sponsor** for the continuing policy work on projects whose research is complete and appear to be solid candidates for acceptance by government agencies and, if needed, the legislature. One approach is to use a contract where the work and budget for the work in the policy development phase is specified as an optional task with the decision on exercising the option deferred until after the main project is completed. The sponsor then can engage the think tank to provide additional analysis and policy support if it is needed by exercising the option. The tasks and price are negotiated between the sponsor and think tank. In addition to tasks that directly support the sponsor’s activities, the think tank can make the case for certain policy work it should do including various forms of networking.

Where think tanks are already receiving funds from these various sources, it will be a matter of generating more funds or reconsidering priorities, i.e., moving funds to post-project policy work from other tasks.

As a general point, it is important to recognize that at many small think tanks the entire follow-on process may be occurring regularly in a simplified form. The president and perhaps one or two others quietly and effectively carry out the functions described below. They are often both the policy entrepreneurs and lead analysts. Resources, particularly their time, probably substantially uncompensated, is somehow found to participate actively in the process.

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9. Endowments can be one form of unrestricted funds.
Among the three participating think tanks, two are not systematically tracking post project policy development opportunities. Of these one has resources (unrestricted funds) that could be used for this purpose and the other does not. The one without resources is conducting little post−project monitoring for its projects and is generally not involved in related policy processes for the projects.

On the other hand, the two that do have some tracking activity underway are more involved but in different ways. Both have funds available for additional research and policy involvement if opportunities are identified.

The most active of the three think tanks is the focus of the rest of this section. This organization has three research centers. The three team leaders and the president meet biweekly, along with the communications and finance directors. These directors are there because follow−on activities often involve these offices. The president directs certain research projects herself.

A routine item on the biweekly agenda is for the four program leaders to report on post−project policy developments on their past projects. When a significant status change is reported, a discussion follows about what, if any, action the institute might take; options may be considered or more information requested for the next meeting. In any case, a decision is made at some point if intervention by the institute is warranted and, if so, what it should be. Twice a year—in the fall when institute’s budget for the next year is being developed and six months later—there are more systematic reviews of the status of policy initiatives that resulted from completed institute research. In cases where there is renewed or continuing activity to get a programmatic change made, the group considers if the institute should take an action, and what type would be appropriate.

Consistent with comments many colleagues have made about the low probability of research project−based policy recommendations being advanced through the policy process, this think tank has found that only a few recommendations advance and even these benefit from further involvement only episodically.

This think tank believes that the process just outlined serves it well. Having all four research directors participate in the review of developments in completed projects is viewed as valuable because the discussion improves decision making and introduces some participants to new ideas on types of intervention that can be employed under various circumstances.
Recognizing post-project policy development opportunities and exploiting them is clearly a very important think tank task. This recognition should spark think tank senior management to identify the true policy entrepreneurs on staff and define how to support them in their follow-on efforts and retain them at the institute.

Recognizing post-project policy development opportunities and exploiting them is clearly a very important think tank task. This recognition should spark think tank senior management to identify the true policy entrepreneurs on staff and define how to support them in their follow-on efforts and retain them at the institute. The “light touch” approach to further policy development tracking outlined above is one option. Doubtless there are others.

Reasonable advice for think tanks that will actively test conducting post-project monitoring to identify needed additional participation on its part to achieve the proposed policy change is to focus initially on tracking programs, rather than one-off projects in a topic area, to identify where additional investment of institute resources are likely to have positive returns. Tracking program developments will be more efficient, as argued earlier. An additional advisory is for the think tank to start with one or two important programs rather than trying to launch the tracking-and-intervention initiative with all research teams at the same time. Lessons from the “learning by doing” action be shared with research centers that begin participating later.

The key point is that the great majority of policy development and advancement work is done after the research project is completed and the results delivered to the funder and the broader policy community. At the same time, it is a fact that comparatively few policy change or program adjustment initiatives advance very far; and, if need be, priorities can be set even among this small number. Thus, the cost of staying active in the post-project stages of initiatives’ lives should be modest.
References


