{"id":1453,"date":"2013-07-10T13:29:14","date_gmt":"2013-07-10T18:29:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/onthinktanks.org\/articles\/\/"},"modified":"2016-01-21T13:31:05","modified_gmt":"2016-01-21T18:31:05","slug":"how-does-the-context-affect-think-tanks-a-few-hypotheses-and-research-questions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/onthinktanks.org\/articles\/how-does-the-context-affect-think-tanks-a-few-hypotheses-and-research-questions\/","title":{"rendered":"How does the context affect think tanks? A few hypotheses and research questions"},"content":{"rendered":"

This is the second post of a series on\u00a0how context affects think tanks<\/a>. The first post dealt with a number of challenges that a study into this relationship would face.<\/p>\n

In this post I will outline some general hypotheses and research that I have been exploring over the last few years. This post is slightly longer the the first one.<\/p>\n

I am not usually too keen to make sweeping generalisations when it comes to this issue. I have my own ideas, of course, but I like to think that they are ‘my’ ideas and therefore perfectly questionable. Others have information that I don’t. In some cases, however, I think it is possible to suggest some working rules of thumb -but even these should be taken with a pinch of salt. The following are only presented as an invitation to study them further, in different contexts and for different think tanks.<\/p>\n

5 Hypotheses<\/h2>\n

At a more general level, I believe that\u00a0think tanks are likely to be stronger if<\/strong>:<\/p>\n

Hypothesis 1: There is, at least, one driving force<\/strong>. Whether it is the State, Elites (political, economic, intellectual, social, etc), the Market, Grassroots, or, even, the Aid Industry (although this is not sustainable), someone has to take the initiative. Think tanks do not emerge out of nothing. In China, without a doubt, the State has taken the initiative when it comes to the formation and support of think tanks; in Japan it has been the corporate world (see this paper on\u00a0South East Asian think tanks<\/a>).<\/p>\n

In the US, the role of the driver has changed over the decades. In the late 1800s and early 1900s this was the role of philanthropists, then came policymakers, later on the military, then the corporate sector and private interests, and, much later, party political entrepreneurs.<\/p>\n

In Africa, foreign Aid Agencies have held this role from before independence and, with some\u00a0inspiring exemptions<\/a>, are unlikely to let go any time soon.<\/p>\n

Hypothesis 2: Other institutions are the strong<\/strong>. A society with a strong State, parties, markets, civil society, the media, academia, etc. is likely to have stronger think tanks. Weak institutions only allow for weak think tanks. Also, when other institutions are weak, think tanks tend to adopt some of the roles that they have failed to deliver and it is therefore harder to tell them apart from consultancies, NGOs, university departments, political movements, etc. This overlapping of functions can be positive but, more often than not, can lead to\u00a0governance minefields<\/a>\u00a0and a complete lack of direction.<\/p>\n

By ‘strong’ I do not mean ‘hard’ or ‘authoritarian’. Rather I am referring to them as professional, competent, well-funded, clearly defined, well-managed, etc. A strong media will work quite well with think tanks: providing them with an agenda, demanding their research and expertise, popularising their ideas, etc. A strong party system (even a single party system) will promote their formation, support their appeals for funding, inform their agendas, demand their ideas, transform them into policy solutions, etc. A healthy academic community will provide think tanks with new researchers, subsidise the long term investments in research that think tanks will need but are unlikely to afford, provide neutral spaces for think tanks to engage each other, etc. A strong private sector and market demands research and advice, pays for think tanks directly and indirectly, etc.<\/p>\n

Hypothesis 3: There is domestic funding<\/strong>. A consequence of the strength of the institutions mentioned in hypothesis 2 is the availability of domestic resources. There is a clear difference between domestically funded and foreign funded think tanks. The organisational culture is different; the relevance of their analysis is always higher among domestically funded think tanks; their ability to connect between institutional fields is far greater among them, too. And the differences start to show as soon as small amounts of domestic funds begin to make an entrance. One only needs to spend some time talking to their staff and directors to notice this.<\/p>\n

Domestic funding is also more predictable and manageable. Domestic funds come from the same political, economic and social communities that the think tanks and their researchers belong to. Funds are allocated and managed by policymakers, businesspeople and community leaders who the think tanks known well and interact with on a regular basis. And the decisions to fund or not are also domestic: whether they be political or economic, it is easy for think tanks to see these decisions coming miles ahead. More importantly, think tanks agendas emerge from the coexistence of fund and ideas.<\/p>\n

But when it comes to\u00a0foreign funders<\/a>, these decisions are more difficult to understand and monitor; the relationships with the funders (often via country representatives based abroad) is impersonal and distant; and the disconnection of funds and ideas tends to culminate in research agendas driven by the interests of foreign funders rather than local researchers and policymakers. And this makes it difficult for think tanks to be relevant and therefore attractive to the few (and future) domestic funders. It is a perverse cycle.<\/p>\n

Hypothesis 4: They have access to the right people<\/strong>. Besides money, the most important resource for think tanks is its human capital. A think tank without competent researchers, managers and communicators is as good as an empty tank. Even worse, a\u00a0septic<\/i>\u00a0tank. It does not matter how much money a think tank has, without a great team think tanks will never be great.<\/p>\n

The consequences of focusing on think tanks’ budgets and not on their capacity to use them properly are several: salary inflation that borders on the unethical, mismanagement and even embezzlement of funds, the eventual and inevitable poaching of highly qualified researchers from government agencies (who need them more), and the also inevitable damage to their reputation and to think tanks in general.<\/p>\n

Hypothesis 5: They are not alone.<\/strong>\u00a0A\u00a0think tank director who has nobody to talk to<\/a>, learn from\/with, compare him\/her self with, etc. is always going to struggle. A single (or a very few) large and well-funded think tank may be the pride of its donors but it is really more than a passing star. It is unsustainable.<\/p>\n

Besides other think tanks, they also need popular and specialized publications, high level consultancies, corporations and policymaking bodies with research capacity, university research departments, advocacy organisations, programmatic parties, etc. In other words:\u00a0Density<\/a>.<\/p>\n

10 Research questions<\/h2>\n

At a more specific level other things matter. And I would argue that they matter even more on a day-to-day basis for think tanks. These are more unpredictable that the factors mentioned above so I won\u2019t offer hypotheses but rather outline some possible research questions (with a few answers thrown in by me):<\/p>\n

Research question 1: How does labour legislation affect think tanks?<\/strong>\u00a0Ray Struyk argues that\u00a0about 70% of think tanks’ budgets go to their staff<\/a>. Hence the capacity of think tanks to hire in the right conditions is crucial. Inflexible labour laws can be a real problem for think tanks whose income is not certain in the long term. Unlike other organisations, think tanks should expect their income to rise and fall with the political cycle; and they should be able to grow and shrink accordingly.<\/p>\n

I have talked to many directors who have expressed concern about the way in which labour legislation affects this crucial adaptive capacity; either because it stops them from employing researchers for fear that they may not be able to afford them (and still be unable to let them go), or because it prevents them from rapidly responding to new opportunities by replacing their staff to match the new required skills.<\/p>\n

Labour legislation can also affect the relationship of think tanks with their associates (non-resident researchers) as well as with interns.To be sure, I am not arguing for irresponsible and unethical employer behaviour; I was a union rep in my old job. But think tanks need to be better at understanding how labour policy affects their business models and be better at dealing with it.<\/p>\n

Research question 2: How does tax legislation affect think tanks?<\/strong>\u00a0Taxation can have significant effects on think tanks. One could assume that because they are usually non-for profits they do not need to worry about this, but this is not the case.\u00a0 Tax policy can affect think tanks in many ways:<\/p>\n